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NATURAL LAW BASIS
FOR THE COPYRIGHT
DOCTRINE OF DROIT
MORAL
ROBERT C. HAUHART*
The copyright doctrine of moral right-the droit moral'-has
achieved its greatest development in Europe,2 especially France' and Ger-
* B.S., Southern Illinois University; A.M., Washington University; J.D., University of
Baltimore.
P. MASSE, Lz DRorr MORAL (1906). Masse was one of the earliest commentators to analyze
the concept of moral right and to popularize the term "droit moral". He defined the au-
thor's moral right as "the negative right to prevent violations of the literary personality of
the author." Id. See generally infra note 14 (definition of "moral right").
' See 2 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHTS § 8.21, at 8-247 (1985). The doctrine of moral
right achieved early continental recognition under the Berne Convention, which identifies
three components of the author's right: publication, paternity and integrity. Diamond, Le-
gal Protection for the "Moral Rights" of Authors and Other Creators, 68 TRADE-MARK REP.
244, 245 (1978). Publication includes the right to create and the right to withhold or with-
draw from publication. Id. Paternity includes the right to receive credit as the author; pro-
tection of the author's anonymity; protection from false attribution and other attacks on the
author's personality and professional standing. Maslow, Droit Moral and §§ 43(a) and
44(i) of the Lanham Act-A Judicial Shell Game?, 48 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 377, 379 n.14,
(1980). Integrity concerns the author's right to modify the work, and to prevent its mutila-
tion or destruction. Id. at 379 n.15. Since most of the early signatories of the Berne Conven-
tion were European countries or their colonies, these nations have had the longest tradition
of providing protection for the author's moral rights. One of several reasons the United
States has never joined the Berne Convention is the required adoption of the doctrine. Id. at
380-81.
' See DaSilva, Droit Moral and the Amoral Copyright: A Comparison of Artist's Rights in
France and the United States, 28 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'¥, 1, 2 (1980) (France is vanguard of
artists' rights); Sarraute, Current Theory on the Moral Right of Authors and Artists Under
French Law, 16 AM. J. COMP. L. 465, 465 (1968) (moral right has grown from decisions
handed down by French courts since middle of last century); Strauss, The Moral Right of
the Author, 4 AM. J. CoMP. L. 506, 506 (1955) (France has pioneered application of doc-
trine). France has produced some of the most influential treatises on the doctrine of moral
right. See, e.g., D'ARGEURNE, LE DRorr MORAL (1925); P. MASSE, supra note 1, E, POUILLET,
PRopRiE LrrirEAmE aT ARTISQUE (3d ed. 1908); C. Aussy, Du D orr MORAL (1911).
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many.4 Beginning in 1928 with the Rome revision of the Berne agree-
ment,' the droit moral began to receive world wide recognition as a legal
right.' One recent commentator suggested that the doctrine has been ac-
cepted by over sixty countries.' It has elicited, in recent years, a great
deal of commentary, both in countries that fully adopt and recognize the
principle,8 and those like the United States that have displayed an equiv-
ocal, often ambivalent, reaction to the theory.9 Yet, in all of this analysis
and discussion, there has been comparatively little attention paid to the
jurisprudential origin of the doctrine.10 This is not to say that the legal
' See, e.g., Hathaway, American Law Analogues to the Paternity Element of the Doctrine
of Moral Right: Is the Creative Artist in America Really Protected? 30 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP.
(ASCAP) 121, 122 n.4 (1980) (term "droit moral" thought to be misleading while German
term "Urheberpersonlichkeitsrecht" held to be more precise); Marcus, The Moral Rights of
the Artist in Germany, 25 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 93, 93 (1975). Marcus prefers the
term "Urheberpersonlichkeitsrecht", literally "creator's personal rights," as far more de-
scriptive than the French "droit moral." Id. But see Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral Right:
A Study in the Law of Artists, Authors and Creators, 53 HARV. L. REV. 554, 554-55 (1940)
(difficult to find expression other than droit moral which would not become unwieldy).
Hoffman distinguishes two approaches in the protection of the author's right. Hoffman, Eu-
ropean Legislation and Judicial Decision in the Field of Copyright in 1930, 8 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 369, 372 (1931). Id. The German view consists of merely a series of particular legisla-
tive grants of protection and can be found in the systems of Denmark, Finland, Holland,
Austria, Sweden, Switzerland, Spain, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary in 1930. Id. He charac-
terizes the other system, which he labels as Roman, as giving the author full right to exploit
his work in every direction and form without limitation of particular legislative grants and
prohibitions. Id. The system is attributed to the French and was followed as of 1930 by
Belgium, Bulgaria, Greece, Great Britain, Poland, Portugal and Romania. Id.
" See supra note 2; McConnell, The Effect of the Universal Copyright Convention on other
International Conventions and Arrangements, 9 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 60-62
(1958)(comparing Berne Convention with Universal Copyright Convention); Note, The
Question of the Berne Entry for the United States, 11 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 421, 428-36
(1979) (discussing difference between American and Berne Convention concepts of moral
right).
O Note, Copyright: Moral Right - A Proposal, 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 793, 797 & n.47 (1975).
' See id.
O See, e.g., H DEsBols, LE DRorr D'AUTEUR EN FRANCE (2d ed. 1976); A. DiETz, DAs DROIT
MORAL DES URHEBERS IM NEUEN FRANZOSISCHEN UND DEUTSCHER URHEBERRECHT (1968); Sar-
raute, supra note 3, at 486 (moral right theory superior because takes better account of
nature of creative act); Colas, Le Droit Moral De L'Artiste Sur Son Oeuvre, 59 CAN. B. REV.
521 (1981).
0 See, e.g., Amarnick, American Recognition of the Moral Right: Issues and Options, 29
COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 31, 81 (1979). Amarnick is of the opinion that "American
'analogues' of the moral right fail to articulate, as a shared value and a social policy, an
attitude of respect for the creative process and its fruits." Id. DaSilva contends that the
doctrine of droit moral is not only overly complicated to apply, but as a product of the
European legal milieu, its transfer to the United States is impossible. DaSilva, supra note 3,
at 57; see also Hathaway supra note 4, at 151 (there is no single analogue in the United
States to doctrine of moral right).
1* The few articles that treat the jurisprudential origin of the droit moral include; Streibich,
NATURAL LAW
history of its development is not available." It is to suggest, however, that
the philosophical basis of the author's moral right has not been explicitly
propounded. The continued calls for American adoption of the doctrine 2
and its importance in international and comparative law require that the
philosophical basis for the doctrine be examined. The purpose of this Ar-
ticle is to trace the theoretical and historical growth of the doctrine to
locate its philosophical roots, which are deeply embedded in natural law
The Moral Right of Ownership to Intellectual Property: Part I - From the Beginning to
the Age of Printing, 6 MEM. ST. U.L. REV. 1, (1975) (giving a historical overview of develop-
ment of moral right theory) [hereinafter cited as Streibich, Part I]; Streibich, The Moral
Right of Ownership to Intellectual Property: Part II From the Age of Printing to the Fu-
ture, 7 MEM. ST. U.L. REv. 45, (1976) (examines copyright law from Renaissance to present)
[hereinafter cited as Streibach, Part II]; see also Patterson, Private Copyright and Public
Communication: Free Speech Endangered, 28 VAND. L. REV. 1161, 1161 (1975) (comparing
effects of electronics revolution in United States and revolution brought about by advent of
printing press in 15th century England upon development of copyright law).
" See, e.g., S. STROMHOLM, LE DROIT MORAL DE L'AUTEUR EN DRior ALLEMAND, FRANCARS ET
SCANDINAVE (1966). Legal history of the doctrine of moral rights is amply documented in the
reports and treatises on legislation and judicial decisions of European Countries. Id.; supra
note 8.
12 See, e.g., Diamond, supra note 2, at 280-81; Note, Abandon Restriction, All Ye Who
Enter Here: The New United States Copyright Law and the Berne Convention, 9 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 455, 481-82 (1977); Comment, An Artist's Personal Rights in His Creative
Works: Beyond the Human Cannonball and the Flying Circus, 9 PAC. L.J. 855, 888 (1978);
Comment, Monty Python and the Lanham Act: In Search of the Moral Right, 30 RUTGERS
L. REV. 452, 476-77 (1977); Comment, Moral Rights for Artists Under the Lanham Act:
Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos., 18 WM. & MARY L. Rv. 595, 610-11 (1977).
The Second Circuit Court of Appeal's decision in Gilliam v. American Broadcasting
Cos., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976), was the basis of many of the above articles. In Gilliam, the
Second Circuit held that television presentation of a Monty Python "special" which resulted
in cutting 24 minutes from a 90 minute program constituted mutilation of the work and was
violative of section 43(a) of the Lanham Trademark Act. Id. at 24-25. The Act provides in
part:
Any person who shall affix, apply, or annex, or use in connection with any goods or
services, . . . a false designation of origin, or any false description or representation
... and shall cause such goods or services to enter into commerce ... shall be liable
to a civil action by any person ... who believes that he is or is likely to be damaged
by the use of any such false description or representation.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982). The court held that 43(a) of the Lanham Trademark Act may
afford a remedy when editing by an artist's licensee results in a violation of the artist's
"moral right" to prevent the presentation of his work in distorted form. Gilliam, 538 F.2d at
24; see also Note, Author's Script Protected from Excessive Editing Under Doctrine of
Common Law Copyright and Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act-Monty Python v. Ameri-
can Broadcasting Cos., 50 TEMPLE L. Q. 151, 159-60 (1979) (Gilliam court saw no inconsis-
tency between current copyright statutes that protect economic interest and protection of
artist work from mutilation or misrepresentation); Comment, The Monty Python Litigation
of Moral Right and the Lanham Act, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 611, 634 (Gilliam is significant
because it recognizes American Legal System can accomodate assertion of artist's moral
rights).
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theories.
WHAT IS THE DOCTRINE OF MORAL RIGHT?
The precise meaning of the author's moral right varies nation by na-
tion according to jurisdiction. 3 Indeed, the author's moral right is not a
single right but a bundle of rights that protect the personality of the crea-
tor as he has expressed it in his artistic works.'4 It is often said to include
the author's right to paternity in his works and the right to the integrity
of his work as conceived.' 5 It is in addition ascribed more specific rights.
These include: the right to be acknowledged as the author of his work;'
the right to prevent others from falsely attributing to the creator the au-
thorship of work which he has not in fact written;17 the right to prevent
deformation or destruction of his work;"8 the right to withdraw a pub-
lished work from distribution or disavow the work generally if it no longer
represents his views;'9 and the right to prevent others from using the
work or the author's name in such a manner as to reflect adversely on his
artistic reputation.20 Other incidental rights have also been referred to as
moral rights although their legal standing is less certain.2'
Although the doctrine of moral right has an established legislative
and judicial foundation in France, Germany, Italy, and Berne member
' Compare France, Law of March 11, 1957, No. 57-296, 1957 J.O. 2723, 4143 with Germany,
Law of September 9, 1965, arts. 11-14; and Italy, Law of April 22, 1941, No. 633, as
amended, Law of August 23, 1946, arts. 20-24.
14 See Sarraute, supra note 3, at 465. The moral right includes "non-property attributes of
an intellectual and moral character which give legal expression to the intimate bond which
exists between a literary or artistic work and its author's personality; it is intended to pro-
tect his personality as well as his work." Id.; see supra note 4; see also West German GG,
art. I; European Declaration of Human Rights, Judgment of May 25, 1954, 13 Ent-
scheidungen des Bundesrichtshots in Zivilsachen (BGHZ) 334; Italy CONsT. arts. 2 & 22.
' See supra note 2.
' See 2 M. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 8.21, at 8-247; Krigsman, Section 43(a) of the Lanham
Act as a Defender of Artists' "Moral Rights," 73 TRADE-MARK REP. 251, 253 (1983); Mas-
low, supra note 2, at 379; Roeder, supra note 4, at 561-65.
1 See Strauss, supra note 3, at 508-09.
18 G. MICHAELIDES-NoUARos, LE Dlorr MORAL DE L'AUrruR 185-86 (1935); see Whistler v.
Eden, D.H. 1898.2.465, S. 1900.2.201, S-1900.1.489 (France); Caroim v. Carco, D.P.
1928.2.89, Gaz. Pal. 1931.1.678 (France).
'" See Whistler v. Eden, D.H. 1898.2.465, S. 1900.2.201, S-1900.1.498 (France); Caroim v.
Carco, D.P. 1928.2.89, Gaz. Pal. 1931.1.678 (France); G. MICHAxLmEs-NouAnos, supra note
18, at 185-86; 2 M. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 8.21, at 8-247; E. ULMER, URHEBER-UND VERLAG-
SRECHT 197 (1951); Krigsman, supra note 16 at 253; Maslow, supra note 2, at 379.
10 See 2 M. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 8.21, at 8-247.
" See, e.g., Roualt v. Vollard Heirs, Civ. Trib. Seine, July 10, 1946, D.A., 1946, 107; Anatole
France v. Levine, Civ. Trib. Seine, Dec. 4, 1911, Pat. 1912.1.98; Strauss, supra note 3,.at
511-12 (right to create work); G. MICHAELID.s-NoAREs, supra note 18, at 287 (right to pre-
vent excessive, malicious or vexatious criticism).
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nations generally,22 the 1976 Copyright Act accords no formal recognition
of moral right in the United States.2" Protections comparable to those
discussed above have most often been sought in state common law actions
of unfair competition, defamation, invasion of privacy, and breach of con-
tract.24 A number of federal and state courts have concluded that moral
rights are not recognized in the United States, regardless of the theory
under which they have been proposed.2 5 Other courts have made state-
ments to the contrary" and there is growing evidence that authors do
have the right under the law of the United States to prevent truncation
or distortion of their work,27 to demand truthful attribution regarding
their authorship of a work,2" to prevent false attribution of authorship to
work they did not write, 9 and to prevent others from wrongfully chal-
lenging the copyright proprietor's ownership of his work.30 Finally, a re-
cently enacted state law, The California Art Preservation Act,3 ' protects
the works of the fine artist from physical defacement, mutilation, altera-
22 See supra note 2; see also 2 M. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 8.21, at 8-247 (certain European
countries and other Berne Convention Countries have long recognized rights personal to
authors).
2- 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-118 (1982).
'" See Note, Toward Artistic Integrity: Implementing Moral Right Through Extension of
Existing American Legal Doctrines, 60 GEO. L.J. 1539, 1542-43 (1972).
25 See, e.g., Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos., 538 F.2d 14, 24 (2d Cir. 1976) (law vin-
dicates economic rather than personal rights of authors); Vargas v. Esquire, Inc., 164 F.2d
522, 526 (7th Cir. 1947) (legislative function to determine if "moral rights" should be pro-
tected); Crimi v. Rutgers Presbyterian Church, 194 Misc. 570, 576-77, 89 N.Y.S.2d 813, 819
(Sup. Ct. New York County 1949) (artists' rights protected only as contractual rights); see
also Stevens v. National Broadcasting Co., 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 755 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1966).
But see Geisel v. Poynter Prods., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 331, 340 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (moral
right not part of United States law except insofar as parts of that doctrine exist in our law
as specific rights such as copyright, libel, privacy and unfair competition).
26 See, e.g., Edison v. Viva Int'l Ltd., ..70 App. Div. 2d 379, 384, 421 N.Y.S.2d 203, 206 (1st
Dep't 1979) ("moral rights" subsumed in contractual rights) (dictum); Shostakovich v.
Twentieth Century - Fox Film Corp., 196 Misc. 67, 70-71, 80 N.Y.S.2d 575, 578-79 (Sup. Ct.
New York County 1948) (court can recognize "moral right" in proper case) (dictum), aff'd,
275 App. Div. 692, 87 N.Y.S.2d 430 (1st Dep't 1949).
17 See Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos., 538 F.2d 14, 24 (2d Cir. 1976); see also
Prouty v. National Broadcasting Co., 26 F. Supp. 265, 266 (D. Mass. 1939) (defendant's
appropriation of plaintiff's work amounted to deception of public, therefore relief may be
granted by applying principles of equity).
" See 2 M. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 8.21[D], at 8-266 to 8-270. Until recently the prevailing
view was that an author who sold his work did not, absent an appropriate contractual provi-
sion, have a right to be credited as the author of the work. See, e.g., Clemens v. Press Pub-
lishing Co., 67 Misc. 183, 184, 122 N.Y.S. 206, 207 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1st Dep't 1910).
" See Geisel v. Poynter Prods. Inc., 283 F. Supp. 261, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Clevenger v.
Baker Voorhis & Co., 8 N.Y.2d 187, 192, 168 N.E.2d 643, 646, 203 N.Y.S.2d 812, 816 (1960).
30 2 M. NIMMER, supra note 2, § 8.21[E], at 8-270 to 8-270.5.
31 CAL. CIv. CODE § 987 (West 1982 & Supp. 1986).
1
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tion, or destruction."2 However, works of literary content, of merely deco-
rative value,"3 or those "made for hire" and purchased for commercial
purposes, 4 are not protected.
A NATURAL LAW FOUNDATION FOR THE MORAL RIGHT OF THE AUTHOR
Natural law theories are among the oldest jurisprudential theories
known.-5 Early natural law theories can be traced to the ancient Greek
philosphers, especially Plato and Aristotle. 3 Plato, in his Minos, de-
scribed law as tending toward discovery of the ideal form of perfect law. 7
Aristotle developed the distinction between natural justice and conven-
tional justice.38 Neither, however, went so far as to create a systematic
natural law theory.3 9
Early natural law theories, like much of primitive law'0 generally,
paid scant attention to property relations between men. Rather, the em-
phasis was on the ethical and the just, and the abstract principles of jus-
tice common to all mankind.
The Roman lawyer and orator Cicero, a student of the Stoics, a group
which revived natural law teaching after Aristotle,4 ' deviated from the
path of the developing Roman law. He imported into Roman law the idea
31 CAL. CIV. CODE § 987(c)(1) (West 1982 & Supp. 1986). The Act states:
No person, except an artist who owns and possesses a work of fine art which the artist
has created, shall intentionally commit, or authorize the intentional commission of,
any physical defacement, mutilation, alteration, or destruction of a work of fine art.
Id.
33 CAL. CIv. CODE § 987(b)(2) (West Supp. 1986). "Fine Art" is defined in the California
Civil Code as "an original painting, sculpture, or drawing, or an original work of art in glass
of recognized quality, but shall not include work prepared under contract for commercial
use by its purchaser." Id.
3 CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 987(b)(2) & (b)(7) (West 1982 & Supp. 1986). Section 987(b)(7) defines
"commercial use" as "fine art created under a work-for-hire arrangement for use in advertis-
ing, magazines, newspapers, or other print and electronic media." Id.
35 E. PATTERSON, JURISPRUDENCE MEN AND IDEAS OF THE LAW 6 (1953); Rose, The Law of
Nature: An Introduction to American Legal Philosophy, 13 OHIo ST. L.J. 121, 122 (1952).
See R. HUTCHINS, NATURAL LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN NATURAL LAW AND MODERN SocI-
r" 30 (1963).
37 Rose, supra note 35, at 12-23.
"See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS IN THE GREAT LEGAL PHILOSOPHERS, 21 (Morris
1959), "A rule of justice is natural that has the same validity everywhere, and does not
depend on our accepting it or not. A rule is conventional that in the first instance may be
settled in one way or the other indifferently, though having once been settled it is not indif-
ferent . . . ." Id.
11 See J. SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE 16 (12th ed. 1966).
40 A. S. DIAMOND, PRIMITIVE LAW 260-76 (1935).
" G. PATON, A TEXT-BooK OF JURISPRUDENCE 101-02 (4th ed. 1963); see E. PATTERSON,
supra note 35, at 342.
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of the jes gentium, a conception of law universal to all peoples.42 Al-
though unsubstantiated, it is likely that Cicero influenced Gaius, an early
commentator on Roman law. Gaius maintained that the jus rationale de-
rived from the natrualis ratio, or the natural reason of man,43 and thus
provided a non-theistic philosophical justification for the civil law of
Rome."" It is especially significant that the first appearance of natural law
theory in relation to property' 5-and to literary property4 6-appears in
Gaius' treatise.
Examples given by Gaius in his treatise are in accord with what we
know about literary life in historical Rome. Plagiarism and censorship,
forms of misappropriation and mutilation encompassed under the moral
rights protections, were widespread in both ancient Greece and Rome. 47
The natural law theories that Cicero and Gaius infused into Roman law
helped combat these practices4 s and much later, the natural rights of au-
thors would be used as a clarion call to protect authors' moral rights.
Natural law theories were revived again after a period of quiescence
in the middle ages. Their popularity at this time has been attributed to
the inherent flexibility of natural law and its "respectable" ancestry. It
was thus a doctrine able to attract supporters from both the liberal and
conservative political camps and accommodate, at least in some fashion,
widely disparate views. 49 The very chaos of the age may have made uni-
versal principles attractive, if no more persuasive than they might be ex-
pressed in other periods.50
The doctrine of moral right may have its most direct ancestry in the
emergence of rights theories generally. Theories of natural rights may be
traced as far back as the twelfth century rediscovery of the Roman Law
Digests. 51 Since the sixteenth century, a proverbial "tug of war" has raged
between supporters of natural law theories and the proponents of positive
" See E. PATTERSON, supra note 35, at 342-43.
" J. MUIRHEAD, THE INSTITUTES OF GAIUS AND RULES OF ULPIAN I, § 1 (1904).
44 Id.
"' Id. at II, §§ 65 (transfer of property), 69 (property captured by enemies), 74 (rights of
riparian owners), 75 (plants), 79 (ownership in general).
" Id. at II, §§ 77 (literary works), 78 (painting).
41 Streibich, Part I, supra note 10, at 4-10.
48 See J. MUIRHEAD, supra note 43, at II, §§ 77, 78. Gaius, for example, announces the value
of literary and artistic production. These equitable doctrines provided for recovery actions
against the misappropriation of either the implements of writing or art, as well as the writ-
ing or art itself. Id.
41 See Streibich, Part I, supra note 10, at 10-13.
"0 G. PATON, supra note 41, at 99.
5' Id. St. Thomas Aquinas, Francisco Suarez and Richard Hooker exhibited generally simi-
lar concepts of Natural Law, however due to their differing political assumptions they dif-
fered considerably in its detailed application. Id.
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legal codes.5 2 The heritage of our modern dichotomy of statutory and
non-statutory protections for authors most likely derives from this long-
standing philosophical struggle.
The conceptual grounds for such a view are not hard to find. Natural
law differs from positive law most directly in this respect: natural law
provides ultimate principles such as the inviolability of an author's per-
sonality which determine the ends of action. Positive law is more earthly
in its aims; it designates a course of action only after consideration of all
the temporal alternatives. The former relies on reason and conscience to
recognize universal, fundamental truths; the latter binds men because of
sanctions built into social relationships and enforced by the state.5 s These
differences parallel the difference between the doctrine of moral rights
and the protections embodied in positive copyright law. Thus, even in
this early period the germ of later theories of natural rights appears
poised in opposition to positive legal developments.
Natural rights theories forced themselves to the forefront of public
debate in the eighteenth century.5 4 The doctrine arose that there were
certain innate rights, issuing from the very nature of man as a rational
being, which were beyond the protections or constraints embodied in pos-
itive law.55 The two major tenets of the seventeenth and eighteenth cen-
turies-individualism and rationalism-inspired this insistence upon in-
herent natural rights. 6 Grotius, Rousseau, and Pufendorf were among the
most influential natural law theorists to fuel the secular natural law re-
surgence. Pufendorf went so far as to demonstrate that the acquisition
and use of property can be, and indeed must be, deduced from reason
alone, and hence from the natural law.5 7 Thus, positive law must be
founded on natural law, and subservient to it, so that inalienable human
62 CHARMONT, Natural Law with Variable Content in 7 MODERN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY SERIES
106-107 (1916).
" See G. PATON, supra note 41.
" See E. BODENHEIMER, READING IN JURISPRUDENCE 31-32 (1962); H. ROMaiEN, THE NATURAL
LAW 75-109 (1947).
" Adler, The Doctrine of Natural Philosophy, in 1 NATURAL LAW INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS
65, 67-68 (A. Scanlon ed. 1947); Brogan, The Natural Law and the Right to Liberty, in 4
NATURAL LAW INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS 24, 26, 29 (E. Barrett ed. 1951). Brogan quotes the
Declaration of Independence as an acknowledgement of Natural Law Principles: "We hold
these truths to be self evident, that all men are created equal; they are endowed by their
Creator with certain inalienable rights . Brogan, supra, at _ . Locke, Montesquieu
and Rousseau are also discussed.
66 See generally H. ROMMEN, supra note 54, at ch. 4. Natural law in the so-called age of
natural law differed from traditional natural-law in its emphasis upon individualism and
rationalism. Id. at 75; A. HARDING, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 71 (1955).
57 See 2 S. PUFENDORF, ELEMENTORUM JURISPRUDENTIAE UNIVERSALIS LIBRI Duo, Definition
V, §§ 12, 15 (1660).
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rights should not be oppressed by man or the state.58
The turning away from natural law in the nineteenth century was
inspired by critics from two quarters-agnostics like Hume and utilitari-
ans like Bentham.59 Common to both was pronounced distrust of power
and insufficient belief in the rational abilities of man to overcome his base
nature. Both embraced varieties of positivism, arguing that the clarity of
the rational mind was not the source of law, but rather the origin of law
derived from the cloaking of human conventions with the power of the
state. 0
Another influential force in the turn to positivism in law during the
last two centuries was the emergence of natural science and the success of
the industrial revolution it sparked. Both scientific positivism and legal
positivism embodied an aversion to metaphysical speculation and the
search for ultimate principles."' Empiricism in scientific and philosophical
thinking was much more in accord with a skeptical, secular, pragmatic
age. The successes of the natural sciences in the early nineteenth century
not only inspired emulators in the social sciences such as Comte, but con-
tributed to the search for a scientific jurisprudence as well.6 2 Although
several different theories of law would have benefited from the shift in
emphasis, natural law was the clear loser.
The twentieth century witnessed a third major revival of natural law
and value-oriented thinking,68 which corresponded to an emphasis on
human rights." While there has been some effort to distinguish the devel-
58 See H. ROMMEN, supra note 54, at 138-41; see also J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF
GOVERNMENT chs. XI, XIII (1690).
'9 See H. ROMMEN, supra note 54, at 110-13.
60 Id. at 127.
6' B. BROWN, THE NATURAL LAW READER 6-9 (1960).
'2 See A. KOCOUREK, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SCIENCE OF LAW ch.1 (1930). The positivist
language of the law emphasized its conception of law and jurisprudence as a meta-science.
In part, this adoption of meta-scientific language can be understood as a desire to trade on
the success and prestige of the sciences and to earn a reputation for wholly objective, rigor-
ous professionalism. Id; see also J. REDDIE, SCIENCE OF LAW chs. 1-3 (1980).
63 C. HAINES, THE REVIVAL OF NATURAL LAW CONCEPTS 210-12 (1930). Federal and state
courts, at the turn of the century, became "champions of a revived eighteenth-century indi-
vidualism" who "gave the natural rights or modern higher law doctrine the peculiar trend
which now marks the process of constitutional interpretation in state and federal courts."
Id. at 211; see, e.g., Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Co., 122 Ga. 190, -, 50 S.E.
68, 69 (1905) (right of privacy flows from natural law). During the first three decades of the
twentieth century the higher law doctrine constituted "the central feature of American con-
stitutional law." C. HAINES, supra, at 212 (emphasis in original); see also CHARMONT, LA
RENAISSANCE DU DRorr NATUREL (1910).
L. STRAUSS, NATURAL RIGHT AND HISTORY ch.3 (1953); see also J. MARITAIN, THE RIGHTS
OF MAN AND NATURAL LAW 64-68 (1951). The human person possesses rights merely because
"it is a person, a whole, a master of itself and of its own acts, and which consequently is not
merely a means to an end, but an end, an end which must be treated as such." Id. at 65.
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opment of natural rights theories from the progress of natural law,6" the
history of the twentieth century and its legal thought attest to their inti-
mate connections and common sources.6 6 These are openly expressed and
recognized as early as the eighteenth century. The influence of such natu-
ral law theorists as Locke, Montesquieu, and Rousseau upon the Ameri-
can Declaration of Independence and the French Declaration of the
Rights of Man has been widely acknowledged.6 7 Subsequent national and
international charters and declarations have continued to ground their
existence in natural law and natural rights concepts.6 8 Among these, one
may find the Berne Convention and its doctrine of moral rights of au-
thors. Its heritage in the natural law tradition and the natural rights
movement of the twentieth century can be discovered in the substantive
meaning of its principles or its formal incorporation in natural law and
natural rights documents. The Berne Agreement, for example, has re-
ceived formal recognition as one part of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights.6 A closer examination of the creation of the doctrine of
moral right will substantiate and clarify its origin in the revival of twenti-
eth century natural law and natural rights jurisprudence.
PRECEDENTS AND ATTRIBUTIONS: NATURAL LAw/NATURAL RIGHTS
REASONING AND THE DOCTRINE OF THE AUTHOR'S MORAL RIGHTS
Evidence supporting the view that the moral rights of authors has its
origin in natural law and natural rights doctrines may be found in two
sources-precedents and attributions. The history of the late nineteenth
and twentieth centuries is replete with examples of each form. Further,
there is ample evidence that both civil law and common law countries
recognized the intimate connection of the moral rights of authors and
5 See A. HARDING, supra note 56, at 70-71.
66 J. MARITAIN, supra note 64, at 58-68. The natural law and the conscience of a person "do
not prescribe merely things to be done and not to be done; they also recognize rights, in
particular, rights linked to the very nature of man." Id. at 64-65.
11 N. KORKUNOV, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW 379-80 (1909). Montesquieu's theory concerning
the separation of the powers of government quickly became popular. Id. at 380; E. CORWIN,
LIBERTY AGAINST GOVERNMENT 45 (1948); DURANT, ROUSSEAU AND REVOLUTION (1967).
" See Perelman, Can the Rights of Man Be Founded?, in ROSENBAUM, THE PHILOSOPHY OF
HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 45, 48-50 (A. Rosenbaum ed. 1980); see also
The International Declaration of the Rights of Man, in J. MARITAIN, THE RIGHTS OF MAN
AND THE NATURAL LAW Appendix (1951).
*' UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS
(1948). Article 27 reads:
(1) Everyone has the right freely to participate in the culture of the community, to
enjoy the arts and to share in the scientific advancement and its benefits.
(2) Everyone has the right to protection of the moral and material interests resulting
from any scientific, literary, or artistic production of which he is the author.
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natural law theories at relatively early stages. Indeed, it appears that such
formal recognition may have appeared earliest in the common law coun-
tries where the development of the doctrine has been slow. 0 The lan-
guage of cases and commentaries asserting the author's moral rights are
woven with frequent references and digressions into natural law and nat-
ural rights discussions.
Civil Law Systems
Evidence from the civil law systems is most readily accessible to
American scholars from precedents and commentaries on French law.
One may note extensive reference to natural law, natural rights, and ina-
lienable rights as the basis for the author's right to receive recognition for
and control of his work.
The Roualt case is exemplary.71 Roualt agreed to deliver the entire
portfolio of his works-over 800 extant paintings-to Amboise Vollard.
Roualt had access to the paintings and made changes and additions as he
saw fit. Upon Vollard's death, his heirs sued for delivery. The Paris Court
of Appeal concluded that the painter remains master of his work until
delivery without reservation after full completion to the artist's satisfac-
tion. In a lengthy discussion of this aspect of the author's moral right, the
Court described it as an "inalienable right" so fundamental that the
Court thought it could not be abrogated by contract or agreement to the
contrary.72
In addition to the explicit references to inalienable rights and natural
law, it is important to recall that, in effect, all of the nineteenth century
French cases were implicitly decided on natural law and natural rights
grounds. There existed no positive law protections equivalent to the
rights regularly sanctioned by French Courts. As Sarraute and others
have noted 7 the droit moral originated as judge made law. The only ex-
isting French statute prohibiting literary crimes during the first eighty
years of the ninetenth century were criminal statutes against plagiarism
passed during the period of the Revolution.7' These were pressed into ser-
10 See infra notes 85-112 and accompanying text.
71 App. Paris, March 19, 1947, D.P. 1949.20.
71 Sarraute, supra note 3, at 465. French law separates the concept of literary and artistic
rights into two elements, the second of which is the "moral" right. Id. The moral right had
no basis in any code, but rather evolved gradually out of the decisions handed down by
French courts. Id. The "real credit" for differentiating the various aspects of the moral right
belongs to the courts. Id. at 466. The moral right has since acquired a statutory character as
well. Id.
73 Sarraute, supra note 3. The moral right of the artist in France has been put into statu-
tory form, although it also continues to develop through judicial interpretation. Id.
74 See, e.g., Decree of January 13-19, 1791; Decree of July 19 and August 6, 1973.
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vice occasionally to buttress the developing theory of droit moral, a civil
protection. The Tribunal Correctionnel in 184571 held that the sculptor
Clesinger had the right to institute criminal proceedings against the
transferees of a statute created by him. The court did so not on the
ground that the transferees had stolen the sculpture, for it was not a theft
case, but rather on the novel theory that they had mutilated it.76 The
court declared that "independent of the pecuniary interest, there exists in
the artist an interest more precious, that of his reputation . . . ." The
theory was imported into the law out of whole cloth, yet this theory was
absent from positive law. The obvious inference is that its source is some
law superior to the statutory law-natural law. Slowly, accretions to the
French law resulted in a statutory basis for the author's moral rights. In
1881, the French recognized a corollary to the rights of paternity and rep-
utation under statute-the right to reply to criticism of an author's crea-
tive work and to have the reply published.7 7 The 1957 revision of the civil
code incorporated and unified the judge-made laws concerning droit
moral into the civil code. While it is axiomatic that the civil law nations
do not have law outside their codes," France, the archetype of civil law
jurisdictions, created the droit moral from unnamed and sub-rosa sources
in the natural law a century before it formally recognized its existence.
While references in many of the cases are oblique, commentators on
the French law of droit moral are in agreement. As DaSilva noted:
"French scholars regard the droit l'auteur as a natural right, deeply
rooted in the principles of the French Revolution from which modern
French Jurisprudence emerged. ' '7 9 Monta, discussing the 1957 French
statute, expressed a similar recognition of the sources of droit l'auteur.
"It sounds like the proclamation of the rights of man. These are obviously
proclaimed to be natural rights independent of statute, and the statute
acknowledges the existence thereof by providing for appropriate ways and
means of protection. ' 80 As DaSilva observed, it is widely accepted that
the droit moral is part of the "natural law" that arose, specifically, from
the same spirit as natural law theories that inspired the French Revolu-
75 Clesinger et Laneuville C. Gauvain, Trib. corr. de Lyon, Jan. 5, 1850, D.P. 1850.3.14.
7' Roeder, supra note 4, at 555.
77 Law of July 29, 1881, as amended by Law of September 29, 1919, Article 15, D.P.
1921.4.7.
78 H. LIEBESNY, FOREIGN LEGAL SYSTEMS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 26-32 (4th rev. ed. 1981).
"[Tlhe law should be clear, and stated in written form so that, as much as possible, every
citizen would know what are his rights and duties. Only by this clarity may litigation be
decreased, injustices avoided, and freedoms preserved." Id. at 30.
79 DaSilva, supra note 3, at 7.
80 Monta, The Concept of "Copyright" Versus the "Droit D'Auteur", 32 S. CAL. L. REV. 177,
178 (1959).
NATURAL LAW
tion.8' References to the "natural right" character of the droit moral ap-
pear side by side, intermixed, with discussions of the "natural law" origin
and the development of doctrines associated with moral rights.82 Natural
rights and natural law appear to be used as distinctions without a differ-
ence in the history of the droit moral.
The recent history of French droit moral coincides with international
recognition of the doctrine. It is instructive that it has been incorporated
into the international human rights declarations as part of the body of
universal human rights.8 The natural law basis of universal human rights
movements has been amply documented.8 '
British Common Law
Similar evidence may be adduced with respect to development within
British common law countries that accords roughly equivalent protections
under copyright from a natural law heritage. Early restatements of the
English law of property and literary property relied on the views pro-
pounded by Gaius in his treatise on Roman law.8 English commentators
adapted the Roman theories of occupatio and possessio, and acknowl-
edged the natural law origin of notions of literary justice.86
The literary property debates that erupted in the sixteenth and sev-
enteenth centuries between authors, booksellers, Crown, and public pro-
vide a plethora of natural law references to the "inalienable" rights of
authors. The earliest English case to construe the meaning of modern En-
glish copyright, Millar v. Taylor,8 7 shows such an influence. Mr. Justice
Aston stated:
The common law, now so called, is founded on the law of nature and reason.
Its grounds, maxims, and principles are derived from many different foun-
tains ... from natural and moral philosophy, from the civil and canon law,
from logic, from the use, custom, and conversation among men, collected
out of the general disposition of nature and condition of human kind."M
Millar is widely accepted as substantiating the existence of a common law
copyright under English law. 9
81 See DaSilva, supra note 3, at 9; Sarraute, supra note 3, at 465.
61 DaSilva, supra note 3, at 8, 11.
83 See supra note 69.
" J. MARITAIN, supra note 64, at 64-68.
2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 404-07.
" W. BLACKSTONE supra note 85, at 404; J. LOCKE, supra note 58, ch. V; see also, Hauhart,
The Origin and Development of the British and American Patent and Copyright Laws, 5
WHrrrIER L. REv. 539, 558-60 (1983) (sources of patent and copyright principles).
87 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (K.B. 1769).
" Id. at 223.
" See generally id. at 201-66. Some modem authors also explicitly acknowledge that Mil-
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Seven years after Millar, Donaldson v. Beckett" reassessed the opin-
ion concerning common law copyright delivered in Millar, but did so
amidst frequent admission that the natural and common law were the
sources for rights that had been incorporated into the Statute of Anne.9 1
The court in Donaldson concluded that common law copyright had been
supplanted by statutory copyright. However, the case did not really ad-
dress any of the author's rights at common law other than the right to
perpetual ownership, including the right to reprint.2 Copies were regu-
larly defaced and mutilated during this historical period to permit dis-
honest booksellers and publishers to issue volumes insignificantly "differ-
ent" than the original and thereby evade the spirit of the law."' Such
practices, while at the heart of the economic issue, were not the legal fo-
cus of Donaldson.
Other commentaries and cases from this period reflect the legal rec-
ognition of natural law and common law rights to literary works and the
divided nature of society and the law on the subject. Enfield wrote a
lengthy learned commentary on the subject in 1774 in response to the
Donaldson case.94 He described the debate in perspective terms: "the au-
thor of any literary composition has a natural right of property in the
work, is the point now to be established. '95 Enfield goes on to suggest
that this question is merely one aspect of determining whether the right
of property in general is founded upon "the general laws of nature" or is
an "institution of civil society." ' Enfield concludes that property must be
part of the natural inheritance people entrust in "sacred deposit" in the
hands of their governors. By analogy, literary property must arise from
the same source and be entitled to the same unstated protections.
To take possession of any work, for any purposes which interfere with the
interest of the author, farther than he himself of his assigns assent to it, is,
on the principles of natural law, no less an invasion of property, than that of
plundering a man's granaries of his coffers.9 7
lar v. Taylor admitted to the existence of an author's creative rights in sixteenth and seven-
teenth century England. See L. PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORCAL PERSPECTIVE 71-73
(1968).
1 Eng. Rep. 837 (K.B. 1774).
" An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, 1709 8 Annee, ch. 19.
9" L. PATTERSON, supra note 89, at 173-75.
93 H. RANsoM, THE FIRST COPYRIGHT STATUTE 127-28 (1956). During the 1590's a number of
works, including Romeo and Juliet and Henry the Fifth, were pirated. Id. at 127; see also
Enfield, Observations on Literary Property, in THE LITERARY PROPERTY DEBATE: EIGHT
TRACTS (1774-1775) (Park ed. 1975).
" See Enfield, supra note 93, at 9-52.
95 Id. at 12.
" Id.
97 Id. at 23.
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Enfield concluded:
The sum of the preceding observations is this. The right of authors to
the exclusive possession of their own works is founded in nature; and unless
any sufficient cause appears for depriving them of it, ought to be secured
and guarded by law. 8
A similar view was expressed in a dissenting opinion in a Scottish
case reconsidering the issues raised in Donaldson."9 Lord Monboddo
stated:
The common law of Scotland and England must, I think, be the same
in this case, as the common law of both is founded upon common sense and
the principles of natural justice, which require that a man should enjoy the
fruits of his labors.
Upon the whole, therefore, I am of the opinion, first, that authors had a
right of property in their works before this act was made; and second, that
such a right was not taken away by the act. 00
English common law acceptance of the natural law origins of author's
rights permeates American law as well. As in England, common law copy-
right has been replaced-in most instances-by statutory copyright.'O
Vestiges of common law protection remain in certain equivocal pockets of
indecisive national policy. One of these is the doctrine of droit moral.
American Law
An early American copyright case, Wheaton v. Peters,02 recognized
the natural law basis for common law copyright but followed the English
lead in Donaldson in subordinating common law copyright to statutory
copyright. 0 3 In the American view, however, publication and statutory
protection not only secured common law rights and superseded them, it
essentially negated and replaced them. The case for natural law and com-
" Id. at 51.
" Hinton v. Donaldson (Court of Session, Edinburgh, 1774); PARKS, THE LITERARY PROP-
ERTY DEBATE: Six TRACTS (1764- 1774) (1975).
'" See Enfield, supra note 93, at 13.
101 See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1982). Section 301 provides, in part, "[A]I
legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general
scope of copyright ... are governed exclusively by this title." Id; see also Brown, Unifica-
tion: A Cheerful Requiem for Common Law Copyright, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1070, 1078-89
(1977) (unified system does not significantly diminish rights existing under state law). But
see Goldstein, Preempted State Doctrines, Involuntary Transfers of Compulsory Licenses:
Testing the Limits of Copyright, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1107, 1108 (1977) (act abolishes state
laws equivalent to copyright). Section 301 is a prime example of what it means to depart
from the objects of copyright. Id. at 1108.
10 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834).
10 Id. at 657-59.
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mon law copyright appeared in the dissenting opinions of Mr. Justice
Thompson and Mr. Justice Baldwin. Mr. Justice Thompson described the
common law copyright as "established in sound reason and abstract mo-
rality,"1 0 4 a reference intended to evoke the principles of right, reason,
and natural law. The majority held to the contrary, stating that copyright
was a grant from the government in the form of a statutory privilege, not
the sanction of a preexisting natural right.10 5
Early American commentators on domestic and international copy-
right continued to recognize the contribution of natural law to the protec-
tions available to authors either through common law or statutory copy-
right.10 6 The common natural law basis for authors' creative rights was
one shared strand that influenced supporters of international copyright in
the nineteenth century. 7 American commentators in recent years have,
either implicitly0 8 or explicitly, 10 9 stated their acknowledgement of the
natural law origin of many of the rights equivalent to the European au-
thor's moral rights. Some American courts have made similar state-
ments,110 although it is widely understood that the author's moral and
creative rights are not, at present, either fully recognized or protected
under American law." This is one explanation for the lack of critical
discussion on the origin of the author's moral rights in American law: if
the rights don't exist, how can they have antecedents? Frequent calls for
reform of the American copyright law have been made so that the au-
thor's moral rights might acquire the protection that many commentators
believe they deserve.
111
CONCLUSION
The doctrine of moral right has an established place in the national
laws of the European countries. Under the auspices of the Berne Conven-
tion, the doctrine has been accepted in many other nations throughout
the world. Even in countries where the theory of the author's moral rights
Id. at 672 (Thompson, J., dissenting). Justice Thompson argued that the copyright of
authors was protected by the principle of "right and wrong, the fitness of things, conve-
nience and policy." Id. at 671 (Thompson, J., dissenting); see also Wheaton v. Peters, 29 F.
Cas. 862, 866-67 (E.D. Pa. 1832) (No. 17,486).
105 33 U.S. at 661.
106 See J. HYSLOP, THE ELEMENTS OF ETHICS 432 (1895).
107 A. CLARK, THE MOVEMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT IN NINETEENTH CENTURY
AMERICA 20 (1960).
10 Patterson, supra note 10, at 1183.
1O Streibich, Part II, supra note 10, at 63-72.
110 See supra notes 26-27.
1" See supra note 25.
11, See, e.g., Bill introduced to amend Copyright Act of 1976, H.R. 288, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1979); see also supra note 2.
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has not achieved the status of recognized law, certain protections exist
within existing legislation. Further, there continues to be frequent expres-
sions of support for adoption of the doctrine.
There has been, however, a paucity of scholarly inquiry into the his-
torical and jurisprudential origin of the doctrine. Allusions to the source
of the theory usually end with reference to nineteenth century French
courts. To the contrary, many small bits of evidence exist which tend to
demonstrate, in sum, that the philosophical origin of the theory of the
author's creative and moral rights may be found in natural law. Natural
law theories of property found in the early Roman law and adopted by
the English provide one source of data. Similarly, early natural law jurists
and philosophers concerned with natural rights provide another source of
support for the type of rights embraced by the doctrine. Moreover, re-
newals and revivals of natural law jurisprudence and natural rights move-
ments coincide with the development of the doctrine. A complete lack of
data indicating other potential sources of the theory essentially closes
other alternative possibilities. The best argument that can be made is
that the droit moral has its philosophical roots buried deeply in natural
law theories that permeate both the later English and American common
law and the natural rights movements of the eighteenth, nineteenth, and
twentieth centuries.
